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Abstract
We assess the strength of the diﬀerent conditions identiﬁed in the literature of robust
mechanism design. We focus on three conditions: ex post incentive compatibility,
robust monotonicity, and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has
been shown to be necessary for any concept of robust implementation, while robust
monotonicity and robust measurability have been shown to be necessary for robust
(full) exact and virtual implementation, respectively. This paper shows that while
violations of ex post incentive compatibility and robust monotonicity do not easily go
away, we identify a mild condition on environments in which robust measurability is
satisﬁed by all social choice functions over a residual set (i.e., a countable intersection
of open and dense sets) of ﬁrst-order types. We conclude that, to the extent that
ex post incentive compatibility is permissive, robust virtual implementation can be
signiﬁcantly more permissive than robust exact implementation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: robust mechanism design, ex post incentive compatibility, robust mono-
tonicity, robust measurability.
1 Introduction
Our attempt in this paper is to assess the strength of the diﬀerent conditions identiﬁed in
the literature of robust mechanism design. These include conditions relevant for partial
implementation, as well as full implementation. Such an assessment is important in the
understanding of the possibilities and limitations in the design of decentralized institutions.
By robustness, what is meant is that the assumption of common knowledge of the entire
type space is not made, and hence the goal is that implementation results survive when
applied to all type spaces whose higher-order beliefs are compatible with an original simpler
common knowledge structure. Consistent with the robustness desideratum, the solution
concept in which implementation is sought is the iterative elimination of strictly dominated
strategies.
Three conditions are the crucial ones: ex post incentive compatibility, robust mono-
tonicity and robust measurability. Ex post incentive compatibility has been shown to be
necessary for robust partial implementation (Bergemann and Morris (2005)) and also for ro-
bust full implementation, both exactly and virtually (Bergemann and Morris (2009a,2010),
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Artemov, Kunimoto and Serrano (2010)).1 When one requires full implementation and this
is sought to be exact, the condition of robust monotonicity, along with ex post incentive
compatibility, crops up as necessary and almost suﬃcient (BM (2010)). And ﬁnally, if full
implementation is still required, but exact implementation is relaxed to allow approxima-
tions of the social choice function (SCF), the so-called virtual implementation paradigm,
robust measurability is the condition that emerges in the characterization (BM (2009a),
AKS (2010)).
Ex post incentive compatibility is extremely demanding if one wishes to apply it over
an unrestricted domain of environments (Jehiel, Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moldovanu and Zame
(2006)). One way out from this negative result is the consideration of interesting subdo-
mains in which the condition is still permissive (see BM (2009b) and the references therein).
Another way out that one can conceivably consider is to study the case of robustness with
respect to intermediate relaxations of the common knowledge assumption. For example,
AKS (2010) consider ﬁnite sets of ﬁrst-order types, each of which comprises a pair of payoﬀ
type and the ﬁrst-order belief over the payoﬀ type space. In that analysis, the relevant
incentive compatibility condition applies to the ﬁrst-order types that are present in the
model. This notion is termed ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility in AKS (2010). However,
when one considers approximations of the unrestricted set of ﬁrst-order beliefs, this notion
does not make a diﬀerence. Indeed, we shall show in Theorem 1 that ex post incentive
compatibility is equivalent to ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility when imposed over any
open and dense set of ﬁrst-order beliefs. The equivalence is also extended to a locally
uniform version of the condition.
Next, we take on robust monotonicity. Robust monotonicity is the requirement of
Bayesian monotonicity in every type space. In Theorem 2 we show an equivalence between
robust monotonicity when imposed over ﬁrst-order beliefs in the interior of the probability
simplex and a locally robust version of the condition. The result shows that a violation
of robust monotonicity in one speciﬁc type space can be extended to an open ball of
environments around it.
We learn from the ﬁrst two results that violations of ex post incentive compatibility
and robust monotonicity do not easily go away. When such violations are found, they will
still remain in approximations of the environment. In contrast, Theorem 3 asserts that the
same is not true about robust measurability in general environments.2 That ﬁnal result
shows that, over weakly non-separable environments, robust measurability is satisﬁed by
all SCFs over a residual subset (i.e., a countable intersection of open and dense sets) of
ﬁrst-order type spaces. The proof relies on the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs satisfying ﬁrst-
order type diversity, initially proposed in Serrano and Vohra (2005) and also used in AKS
(2010).3
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces preliminaries. Sections 3,
4 and 5 deal in turn with the incentive compatibility, monotonicity and measurability
results. Section 6 closes the paper with two illustrative examples.
1In the sequel, we shall refer to these sets of authors as BM and AKS, respectively.
2BM (2009a,b, 2010) provide a set of results in which the gap between (robust) exact and virtual
implementation vanishes. Our diﬀerent conclusion stems from the fact that we shall work with weakly
non-separable environments, arguably a mild condition when arbitrary utility functions are allowed.
3In those papers, the ﬁrst-order type spaces are ﬁnite, something not assumed here.
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2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and Θi be the set of ﬁnite payoﬀ types of
agent i. Assume that |Θi| ≥ 2 for each i ∈ N to avoid the case of degenerate beliefs.
Denote Θ ≡ Θ1 × · · · × Θn, and Θ−i ≡ Θ1 × · · · × Θi−1 × Θi+1 × · · · × Θn.4 Let qi(θ−i)
denote agent i’s ﬁrst-order belief that other agents receive the proﬁle of types θ−i.5 Let
Qi be the (nonempty) set of such all probabilistic ﬁrst-order beliefs of agent i. Note that
Qi is any (nonempty) subset of Δ(Θ−i) for each agent i, where Δ(Θ−i) denotes the set
of probability distributions over Θ−i. We call Ti ≡ Θi × Qi the set of ﬁrst-order types of
agent i. Agent i’s ﬁrst-order type ti contains information about his payoﬀ type θi and the
ﬁrst-order belief over Θ−i.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be independent of the in-
formation state. Suppose A = {a1, . . . , aK} is ﬁnite. Let Δ(A) denote the set of probability
distributions on A.6
Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui :
Δ(A)×Θ → R.
We can now deﬁne an environment as E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ), which is implicitly
understood to be common knowledge among the agents. In particular, if Qi is unre-
stricted for each i, that is, Qi = Δ(Θ−i), we call it a payoﬀ environment denoted as
EΔ = (A, {ui,Θi}i∈N ).
We denote a type of agent i by τi and the agent i’s set of types by Ti. A type τi of
agent i must include a description of his ﬁrst-order type, which in turn includes a payoﬀ
type. Thus, there is a function tˆi : Ti → Ti, with tˆi(τi) being agent i’s ﬁrst-order type
when his type is τi. We shall write tˆ(τ) to refer to the proﬁle of ﬁrst-order types when
the type proﬁle is τ . There is also a function θˆi : Ti → Θi, with θˆi(τi) being agent i’s
payoﬀ type when his type is τi. We shall write θˆ(τ) to denote the payoﬀ type proﬁle when
the proﬁle of types is τ . With some abuse of notation, let θˆi(ti) be agent i ’s payoﬀ type
when his ﬁrst-order type is ti. A type τi of agent i must also include a description of his
beliefs about the types of the other agents; thus, for any τ−i ∈ T−i, πi(τ−i|τi) denotes the
probability that agent i of type τi assigns to other agents having types τ−i.
We require that types, ﬁrst-order types and payoﬀ types are coherent with each other.
We express the coherence requirement in the following deﬁnition. A type space T is a
collection:
T = (Ti, θˆi, tˆi, πi)i∈N .
Definition 1 A type space T ≡ (Ti, θˆi, tˆi, πi)i∈N is said to be coherent with an environ-
ment E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ) if, for every i ∈ N and every type τi ∈ Ti, the following two
conditions must hold:
1. for all (θi, qi) ∈ Θi ×Qi, θˆi(τi) = θi whenever tˆi(τi) = (θi, qi);
4Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
5We do not use the assumption of independent beliefs. Since the analysis will proceed on each payoﬀ
type θi separately, for notational simplicity, we employ this rather than the more accurate qi(θ−i|θi).
6The ﬁniteness of A is made only for simplicity. All the arguments in the paper go through as long as
Δ(A) is the set of probability distributions with “countable” supports. Indeed, this will be the case if A is
a complete separable space.
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2. for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, whenever tˆi(τi) = (θi, qi),∫
τ−i:θˆ−i(τ−i)=θ−i
πi(τ−i|τi)dτ−i = qi(θ−i)
The ﬁrst part requires that payoﬀ type and ﬁrst-order type be coherent with each
other. The second part of coherence requires that each agent’s beliefs coincide with his
ﬁrst-order beliefs in whatever concerns other agents’ “payoﬀ” types.7 Note also that when
Qi is unrestricted, i.e., Qi = Δ(Θ−i), this second requirement is a vacuous condition. The
reader is referred to AKS (2010) for the discussion of our coherence assumption.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → Δ(A). Note that the domain
of the SCFs is not the true type space, but the payoﬀ type space. Fix any coherent type
space T throughout. The interim expected utility of agent i of type τi that pretends to be
of type τ ′i corresponding to an SCF f is deﬁned as:
Ui(f ; τ ′i |τi) ≡
∫
T−i
πi(τ−i|τi)ui(f(θˆ(τ ′i , τ−i)); θˆ(τi, τ−i))dτ−i
Denote Ui(f |τi) = Ui(f ; τi|τi).
Deﬁne Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, q′i) to be the interim expected utility of agent i of ﬁrst-order type
(θi, qi) that pretends to be of ﬁrst-order type (θ′i, q
′
i) corresponding to an SCF f as follows:
Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θi, θ−i)
where (θi, qi) ∈ Ti = Θi×Qi and (θ′i, q′i) ∈ Ti = Θi×Qi. Denote Vi(f |θi, qi) = Vi(f ; θi|θi, qi).
We often use the following relationship between interim utility and ﬁrst-order interim
utility of agent i:
Lemma 1 (AKS (2010)) For a given SCF f : Θ → Δ(A), Ui(f ; τ ′i |τi) = Vi(f ; tˆi(τ ′i)|tˆi(τi))
for any coherent type space T .
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a (nonempty) message space Mi for agent i
and an outcome function g : M → Δ(A), where M = ×i∈NMi. Let σi : Ti → Mi denote a
(pure) strategy for agent i and Σi his set of pure strategies.8 9 Let
Ui(g ◦ σ|τi) ≡
∫
T−i
πi(τ−i|τi)ui(g(σ(τ−i, τi)); θˆ(τ−i, τi))dτ−i.
7The second part of the coherence requirement implicitly assumes that a type space T is countable.
However, we can also handle the case of uncountable T by imposing some suitable measurability condition
on T so that the corresponding interim preferences Ui(f |τi) are well-deﬁned. See Duggan (1997) or Serrano
and Vohra (2010) for this treatment.
8To be exact, we must use the notation Σi(Ti) to make the underlying type space explicit. We, however,
omit this dependence, since it is always clear from the context.
9Our notation seems to assume that a message space M can be either ﬁnite or countable. However,
we can also handle the case of uncountable M . In doing so, we must impose some suitable measurability
condition on M so that the corresponding strategy spaces Σi and interim preferences Ui(g ◦ σ|τi) are
well-deﬁned. See again Duggan (1997) or Serrano and Vohra (2010) for this treatment.
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Given a mechanism Γ = (M,g), let Hi be a subset of Σi. A strategy σi ∈ Hi is strictly
dominated for player i with respect to H = ×j∈NHj if there exist τi ∈ Ti and σ′i ∈ Σi such
that for every σ−i ∈ ×j =iHj,
Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|τi) > Ui(g ◦ (σi, σ−i)|τi).
For any subsets H,H ′ ⊆ Σ, where H ′ ⊆ H, we use the notation H → H ′ (read: H is
reduced to H ′) to signify that for any σ ∈ H\H ′, some σi is strictly dominated with
respect to H. Let λ0 denote the ﬁrst element in an ordinal Λ, and let λ + 1 denote the
successor to λ in Λ.10 Let {Kλ}λ∈Λ be a ﬁnite, countably inﬁnite, or uncountably inﬁnite
family of subsets of the strategy space Σ satisfying the following properties: (1) Kλ0 = Σ;
(2) Kλ → Kλ+1 where Kλ = ⋂λ′<λKλ′ for a limit ordinal λ; and (3) K∗ ≡ ⋂λ∈ΛKλ → K
only for K = K∗.
Definition 2 A strategy proﬁle σ ∈ Σ is iteratively undominated if σ ∈ K∗.
Remark: The standard deﬁnition of iteratively undominated strategies only uses a count-
ably inﬁnite number of rounds of elimination of strategies. The above deﬁnition includes
this as a special case. Indeed, Lipman (1994) argues that we need transﬁnite inductions in
some games with countably inﬁnite actions in order to guarantee the equivalence between
the common certainty of rationality and the iterative elimination of never best responses.
This is particularly relevant in mechanism design because the literature often uses count-
ably inﬁnite message spaces in the canonical mechanisms. However, even allowing an
uncountable number of rounds of elimination, Chen, Long, and Luo (2007) show in their
Theorem 1 that K∗ always exists and is unique. Hence, K∗ is well-deﬁned.
An SCF f is said to be exactly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies for
a coherent type space T if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M,g) such that there exists a
unique K∗ = {σ} for which g(σ(τ)) = f(θˆ(τ)) for all τ ∈ T . We add the requirement
that this deﬁnition should hold for every coherent type space T to obtain the deﬁnition of
robust implementation:
Definition 3 An SCF f is robustly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies
if there exists a mechanism Γ = (M,g) such that for any coherent type space T , there exists
a unique K∗ = {σ} for which g(σ(τ)) = f(θˆ(τ)) for every τ ∈ T .
Remark: Given the deﬁnition of robust implementation, we lose nothing by restricting
attention to pure strategies. Furthermore, robust implementation requires that there al-
ways exist a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium in every coherent type space. Chen, Long,
and Luo (2007) show that this guarantees that K∗ is always nonempty without imposing
any structure on the mechanisms.
Consider the following uniform metric on SCFs:
df (f, h) = max
θ∈Θ
max
a∈A
|f(a|θ)− h(a|θ)|,
10An ordinal Λ is a well-ordered set in the order-isomorphic sense. In particular, the well-ordered set of
natural numbers is called the first infinite ordinal. A limit ordinal is an element in Λ that is not a successor.
By λ′ < λ, we mean that “λ′ precedes λ.”
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where the notation f(a|θ) refers to the probability with which f implements a ∈ A in the
payoﬀ state θ.
An SCF f is said to be virtually implementable in iteratively undominated strategies
for a coherent type space T if, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯], there exists an
SCF f ε for which df (f, f ε) < ε and f ε is exactly implementable in iteratively undominated
strategies for the type space T . The deﬁnition of robust virtual implementability now
follows.
Definition 4 An SCF f is robustly virtually implementable in iteratively undomi-
nated strategies if there exists ε¯ > 0 such that, for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯], there exists an SCF f ε for
which df (f, f ε) < ε and f ε is robustly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies.
3 Incentive Compatibility
In a setting that is robust to higher-order beliefs, the standard requirement of Bayesian
incentive compatibility is given by the following deﬁnition:
Definition 5 An SCF f : Θ → Δ(A) is said to satisfy incentive compatibility for a
coherent type space T if for every i ∈ N, τi, τ ′i ∈ Ti,
Ui(f |τi) ≥ Ui(f ; τ ′i |τi).
The notion of ﬁrst-order type suggests the following deﬁnition, which turns out to be
operationally useful:
Definition 6 An SCF f satisﬁes first-order incentive compatibility if, for any i ∈ N ,
and any ti = (θi, qi), t
′
i = (θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∈ Qi,
Vi(f |θi, qi) ≥ Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi).
The next lemma provides a useful link between these concepts and follows directly from
Lemma 1:
Lemma 2 (AKS (2010)) An SCF f : Θ → Δ(A) satisﬁes incentive compatibility for
any coherent type space T if and only if it satisﬁes ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility.
The robust mechanism design literature has often justiﬁed the use of ex post incentive
compatibility for attaining robust implementation (both for partial and full implementa-
tion). We provide this deﬁnition next:
Definition 7 An SCF f satisﬁes ex post incentive compatibility if, for any i ∈ N, θ ∈
Θ, and θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
ui(f(θ); θ) ≥ ui(f(θ′i, θ−i); θ).
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It is easy to see that when Qi = Δ(Θ−i) for every agent i ∈ N , an SCF f is ﬁrst-
order incentive compatible if and only if it is ex post incentive compatible. The next result
extends this observation slightly but in an important direction. The following result asserts
that we cannot relax ex post incentive compatibility by restricting attention to an open
dense subset of Δ(Θ−i). Deﬁne Δ0(Θ−i) = {qi ∈ Δ(Θ−i)|qi(θ−i) > 0 ∀θ−i ∈ Θ−i} be the
interior of Δ(Θ−i).
Theorem 1 Suppose that an environment E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ) satisﬁes the property
that Qi ≡ Δ∗(Θ−i) for each i ∈ N and Δ∗(Θ−i) is an arbitrary open and dense subset
of Δ0(Θ−i). Then, an SCF f satisﬁes ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility if and only if it
satisﬁes ex post incentive compatibility.
Proof : It is straightforward to show that if an SCF is ex post incentive compatible, it
is also ﬁrst-order incentive compatible, for any ﬁrst-order type space.
Hence, we focus on the other direction. Let f be a ﬁrst-order incentive compatible SCF
over an open and dense set Δ∗(Θ−i). Suppose, by way of contradiction, that f is not ex
post incentive compatible. This implies that there exist i ∈ N, θ ∈ Θ, and θ′i 
= θi such
that
ui(f(θ); θ) < ui(f(θ
′
i, θ−i); θ).
By the continuity of expected utility, we can construct qi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i) such that qi(θ−i) =
1− ε for ε > 0 small enough and
Vi(f |θi, qi) < Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi).
Once again, by the continuity of expected utility, there exist an open neighborhoodOδ(qi) ⊂
Δ0(Θ−i), i.e., a δ > 0 small enough such that for any dqi ∈ RH with the property that
‖dqi‖ < δ,
Vi(f |θi, qi + dqi) < Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi + dqi)
where H = |Θ−i|. Note that the norm ‖ · ‖ is induced by the uniform metric dq with the
property that dq(qi, q
′
i) = maxθ−i∈Θ−i |qi(θ−i) − q
′
i(θ−i)| for any qi, q
′
i ∈ Δ(Θ−i). Thus, we
have shown that any nearby ﬁrst-order belief qi+dqi ∈ Oδ(qi) satisﬁes the above inequality,
and Oδ(qi) ∩Δ∗(Θ−i) 
= ∅, which is a contradiction. 
Jehiel et al (2006) and Hashimoto (2008) show that ex post incentive compatible SCFs
are generically constant.11 Therefore, ex post incentive compatibility is quite demanding
if one allows an unrestricted domain of environments. While these results provide a limit
for the success of robust implementation, there are some interesting subdomains of envi-
ronments in which ex post incentive compatibility is still permissive. The reader is referred
to BM (2009b) for such a class of environments where some positive results are obtained.
Moreover, in auction environments, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Bikhchandani (2006)
11There is one diﬀerence with our setup because those papers focus on the case of a continuum of payoﬀ
types. However, this diﬀerence is immaterial because our Theorem 1 and Proposition 1 extend unchanged
to a compact payoﬀ type space. See also the remark after the proof of Lemma 5.
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also propose some subdomains of environments where ex post incentive compatibility is
not restrictive.
If one imposes the ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility condition when all agents’ ﬁrst-
order beliefs are restricted to lie in Δ0(Θ−i) we shall refer to such a conditions as ﬁrst-
order incentive compatibility over Δ0. By Theorem 1, an SCF satisﬁes ex post incentive
compatibility if and only if it satisﬁes ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility over Δ0. Therefore,
we can now consider the following local version of ex post incentive compatibility:
Definition 8 An SCF f satisﬁes locally uniform incentive compatibility if for any
agent i ∈ N , any open set Q0i ⊂ Δ0(Θ−i), and any θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi, we have that:
Vi(f |θi, qi) ≥ Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi) ∀ qi ∈ Q0i .
And this leads easily to the next result:
Proposition 1 An SCF f satisﬁes ex post incentive compatibility if and only if it satisﬁes
locally uniform incentive compatibility.
Proof : We can use Theorem 1 to know that ex post incentive compatibility is equivalent
to ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility over Δ0. Now, clearly if f satisﬁes ﬁrst-order incentive
compatibility over Δ0, it also satisﬁes locally uniform incentive compatibility.
To prove the other implication, assume that f violates ﬁrst-order incentive compatibility
over Δ0. That is, there exist i ∈ N, θi, θ′i ∈ Θi, and qi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i) such that
Vi(f |θi, qi) < Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi).
Since qi ∈ Δ0, by the continuity of expected utility, there exists δ > 0 small enough such
that for any qi + dqi ∈ Oδ(qi),
Vi(f |θi, qi + dqi) < Vi(f ; θ′i|θi, qi + dqi).
Setting Q0i = Oδ(qi), which is an open set in Δ
0(Θ−i), we can conclude that f also violates
locally uniform incentive compatibility. 
Remark: The above result shows that there is no diﬀerence between ex post incentive
compatibility and locally uniform incentive compatibility. Therefore, if ex post incentive
compatibility is very restrictive, it continues to be so for its local version. In other words,
failures to satisfy ex post incentive compatibility will not easily go away.
4 Monotonicity
A number of monotonicity conditions have been suggested in order to answer the question
of (full) exact implementation. We begin this section with several standard deﬁnitions in
the Bayesian implementation literature, suitably adapted to the robust setting.
For agent i, consider a mapping αi = (αi(θi))θi∈Θi : Θi → Θi. A deception α = (αi)i∈N
is a collection of such mappings where at least one diﬀers from the identity mapping.
Given an SCF f and a deception α, let [f ◦ α] denote the following SCF: [f ◦ α](θ) =
f(α(θ)) for every θ ∈ Θ. That is, [f ◦ α] is the SCF that would be implemented if the
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planner wanted to implement f but the agents were to use the deception α : then, in each
payoﬀ state θ, instead of realizing f(θ), the outcome f(α(θ)) would result.
For a payoﬀ type θi ∈ Θi, an SCF f , and a deception α, let fαi(θi)(θ
′
) = f(θ
′
−i, αi(θi))
for all θ
′ ∈ Θ. That is, the SCF fαi(θi) is what would be implemented if the planner wished
to implement f , all agents other than i were to be truthful, and agent i would report
that his payoﬀ type is αi(θi). We write f 
= f ◦ α when there exists θ ∈ Θ such that
f(θ) 
= f(α(θ)).
The following deﬁnition is borrowed from BM (2010):
Definition 9 An SCF f satisﬁes robust monotonicity if for any deception α, whenever
f 
= f ◦ α, there exist i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi, and an SCF y such that:
Vi(y ◦ α|θi, qi) > Vi(f ◦ α|θi, qi) ∀qi ∈ Δ(Θ−i)
while
Vi(f |θ′i, q
′
i) ≥ Vi(yαi(θi)|θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∀θ
′
i ∈ Θi, ∀q
′
i ∈ Δ(Θ−i).
Note that the above deﬁnition for robust monotonicity, as written, does not exactly
coincide with the one presented by BM (2010). 12 Nevertheless, it can be shown that both
are equivalent. Assume that Qi = Δ(Θ−i) for every i ∈ N . Then, robust monotonicity is
equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity for every type space. By our Lemma 1, it is easy to
see that the above deﬁnition is indeed the one for robust monotonicity.
Proposition 2 (BM (2010)) Consider an environment E where Qi = Δ(Θ−i) for every
i ∈ N . If an SCF f is robustly implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, it
satisﬁes robust monotonicity.
Remark: BM (2010) use the iterative deletion of never best responses as their solution
concept. This solution concept is equivalent to iteratively undominated strategies in ﬁnite
mechanisms. For the case of inﬁnite mechanisms, iteratively undominated strategies is
more stringent than iterative removal of never best responses. Thus, a fortiori, robust
monotonicity is a necessary condition for robust implementation in iteratively undominated
strategies.
We shall say that an SCF f satisﬁes robust monotonicity over Δ0 if it satisﬁes robust
monotonicity subject to all agents’ ﬁrst-order beliefs used in the condition being restricted
to lie in Δ0(Θ−i). We note the following simple observation:
Remark: If an SCF f satisﬁes robust monotonicity, it satisﬁes robust monotonicity over
Δ0.
In particular, this implies that robust monotonicity over Δ0 is also a necessary condition
for robust exact implementation in iteratively undominated strategies.
Consider now the following local version of robust monotonicity:
Definition 10 An SCF f satisﬁes local robust monotonicity if for any deception α,
whenever f 
= f ◦α, there exist i ∈ N, θi ∈ Θi, and an SCF y such that for every open set
12When we ﬁx a single qi, this formulation is equivalent to the deﬁnition of Bayesian monotonicity in
Jackson (1991). See also Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987).
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Q0i ⊂ Δ(Θ−i), we have that:
Vi(y ◦ α|θi, qi) > Vi(f ◦ α|θi, qi) ∀qi ∈ Q0i
while
Vi(f |θ′i, q
′
i) ≥ Vi(yαi(θi)|θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∀θ
′
i ∈ Θi ∀q
′
i ∈ Q0i .
Remark: Maintaining the former (“reversal”) clause for the deﬁnition of local robust
monotonicity, we can strengthen the latter (“truth-telling”) clause to Vi(f |θ′i, q
′
i) ≥ Vi(yαi(θi)|θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∀θ
′
i ∈
Θi ∀q′i ∈ Δ0(Θ−i). In other words, we replace Q0i with Δ0(Θ−i) for the range of possible
q
′
is. In particular, the proof of Theorem 2 below will not be aﬀected by this change. Fur-
thermore, we can also accommodate this change in the discussion of Example 2 in Section
6.
Using this deﬁnition, we state and prove our next result:
Theorem 2 An SCF f satisﬁes robust monotonicity over Δ0 if and only if it satisﬁes local
robust monotonicity.
Proof: Clearly, if f satisﬁes robust monotonicity over Δ0, it also satisﬁes local robust
monotonicity.
To prove the other implication, assume that f violates robust monotonicity over Δ0.
This means that there exists an environment with a speciﬁc ﬁrst-order type space (with
beliefs for each i in Δ0(Θ−i)) over which f violates Bayesian monotonicity. That is, there
exists a deception α with f 
= f ◦ α such that for all i ∈ N and for all θi ∈ Θi, there exists
qi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i) such that whenever one has that
Vi(f |θ′i, q
′
i) ≥ Vi(yαi(θi)|θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∀θ
′
i ∈ Θi ∀q
′
i ∈ Δ0(Θ−i),
one also has that
Vi(y ◦ α|θi, qi) ≤ Vi(f ◦ α|θi, qi).
Since expected utility preferences are continuous and qi is in the interior of the probability
simplex, the strictly upper contour sets are open and non-empty, and thus one can rewrite
the last two inequalities as follows: whenever one has that
Vi(f |θ′i, q
′
i) > Vi(yαi(θi)|θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∀θ
′
i ∈ Θi ∀q
′
i ∈ Δ0(Θ−i)
one also has that
Vi(y ◦ α|θi, qi) < Vi(f ◦ α|θi, qi).
Since these inequalities are strict, one can ﬁnd an open neighborhood of qi in which the
same inequalities obtain. It follows that f violates local robust monotonicity. 
Remark: The message of the above result is that, whenever one can ﬁnd a violation of
robust monotonicity, i.e., a violation of Bayesian monotonicity in some ﬁxed ﬁrst-order
type space, such a violation can be extended to an open set of priors around the original
one. Of course, if one found a violation of robust monotonicity on the boundary of Δ(Θ−i),
it may not be possible to extend it to an open set of priors around the original one; see
however Example 2 in Section 6.
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5 Measurability
This section deals with measurability, a condition that is key for virtual implementation in
iteratively undominated strategies. Roughly speaking, it requires that an SCF cannot vary
in two payoﬀ states whenever the types compatible with them have identical preferences.
It was proposed by Abreu and Matsushima (1992), and hence, we shall refer to it as A-M
measurability. Its robust version has been used in BM (2009a); see also AKS (2010).
Denote by Ψi a partition of the set of ﬁrst-order types Ti, where ψi is a generic element
of Ψi and Πi(ti) is the element of Ψi that includes ﬁrst-order type ti.13 Let Ψ = ×i∈NΨi
and ψ = ×i∈Nψi. An SCF f is measurable with respect to Ψ if, for every i ∈ N and every
ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti, whenever Πi(ti) = Πi(t′i),
f(θˆ(ti, t−i)) = f(θˆ(t′i, t−i)) ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Measurability of f with respect to Ψ implies that for any player i, f does not distinguish
between any pair of ﬁrst-order types in the same cell of the partition Ψi.
For every i ∈ N, ti, t′i ∈ Ti, and (n − 1) tuple of partitions Ψ−i, we say that ti is
equivalent to t′i with respect to Ψ−i if, for every f and every f˜ that are measurable with
respect to Ti ×Ψ−i,
Vi(f |ti) ≥ Vi(f˜ |ti) ⇐⇒ Vi(f |t′i) ≥ Vi(f˜ |t′i).
Let ρi(ti,Ψ−i) be the set of all elements of Ti that are equivalent to ti with respect to
Ψ−i, and let
Ri(Ψ−i) = {ρi(ti,Ψ−i) ⊂ Ti| ti ∈ Ti} .
Note that Ri(Ψ−i) forms an equivalence class on Ti, that is, constitutes a partition
of Ti. We deﬁne a ﬁnite, countably inﬁnite, or uncountably inﬁnite family of n-tuples of
partitions, {Ψλ}λ∈Λ, where Λ is an ordinal and for each λ ∈ Λ, Ψλ = ×i∈NΨλi in the
following way. For every i ∈ N ,
Ψλ0i = {Ti},
and with a (possibly transﬁnite) recursion, for every i ∈ N and every λ ∈ Λ,
Ψλ+1i = Ri(Ψ
λ
−i).
Note that for every λ, Ψλ+1i is the same as, or ﬁner than, Ψ
λ
i . Deﬁne Ψ
∗ as follows:
Ψ∗ ≡
⋂
λ∈Λ
Ψλ,
where Ψλ =
⋂
λ′<λ Ψ
λ′ for a limit ordinal λ.
Definition 11 An SCF f satisﬁes A-M measurability if it is measurable with respect
to Ψ∗.
13With respect to Abreu and Matsushima (1992), recall that Ti is not necessarily ﬁnite in our current
treatment.
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Proposition 3 (AKS (2010)) If an SCF f is robustly virtually implementable in itera-
tively undominated strategies, then it satisﬁes A-M measurability.
Remark: Although the original proof of AKS (2010) uses at most a countably inﬁnite
number of iterations in the A-M measurability algorithm, its proof can also be extended
to the case where an uncountable number of iterations is used in the procedure.
When Qi = Δ(Θ−i) for each agent i ∈ N , adapting the above algorithm to the separa-
tion of types (instead of ﬁrst-order types), BM (2009a) deﬁne the following property.
Definition 12 An SCF f satisﬁes robust measurability whenever it satisﬁes A-M measur-
ability for all type spaces coherent with the underlying payoﬀ environment EΔ.
Lemma 3 Suppose Qi = Δ(Θ−i) for every i ∈ N in an environment E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ).
Then, an SCF f satisﬁes A-M measurability if and only if it satisﬁes robust measurability.
Proof : Since Qi is unrestricted, robust measurability is equivalent to A-M measura-
bility for all coherent type spaces. (Lemma 1 takes care of the details of the argument.)

We next formalize the idea that robust measurability is almost always satisﬁed by all
SCFs.14 We consider here unrestricted ﬁrst-order type spaces.
Recall that the set of alternatives is A = {a1, . . . , aK}. Henceforth, we will ﬁnd it
convenient to identify a lottery x ∈ Δ(A) as a point in the (K − 1) dimensional simplex
ΔK−1 = {(x1, . . . , xK) ∈ RK+ |
∑K
k=1 xk = 1}. Deﬁne V ki (θi, qi) to be the interim expected
utility of agent i of ﬁrst-order type (θi, qi) for the constant SCF that assigns ak in each
payoﬀ state Θ, i.e.,
V ki (θi, qi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i)ui(ak; θi, θ−i).
Let Vi(θi, qi) = (V 1i (θi, qi), . . . , V
K
i (θi, qi)). In the rest of the paper, we maintain the
following regularity assumption imposed on the environments. An environment E =
(A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ) is said to satisfy ﬁrst-order no-total-indiﬀerence (ﬁrst-order NTI) if for
each i ∈ N and each ﬁrst-order type ti = (θi, qi), there exist two outcomes ak, ak′ ∈ A such
that V ki (θi, qi) 
= V k
′
i (θi, qi). Hence, in environments satisfying ﬁrst-order NTI, without
loss of generality, for each ﬁrst-order type (θi, qi), normalize expected utility by subtract-
ing the constant mink V ki (θi, qi) and dividing by the positive constant maxk V
k
i (θi, qi) −
mink V ki (θi, qi).
Consider now the following deﬁnition:
Definition 13 A payoﬀ environment EΔ = (A,Θi, ui)i∈N is weakly non-separable if,
for any i ∈ N , any θi and θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i, there exist a ∈ A and θ−i, θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i with
θ−i 
= θ′−i such that:
ui(a; θi, θ−i)− ui(a; θi, θ′−i) 
= ui(a; θ
′
i, θ−i)− ui(a; θ
′
i, θ
′
−i) (∗).
14For ﬁnite environments, the argument can be found in AKS (2010).
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It is easy to check that weak non-separability excludes private values environments.
Outside of private values, when a payoﬀ environment violates it, preferences are strongly
separable, in that for at least two payoﬀ types of an agent, the relative impact of interde-
pendence on the change in ex-post utilities is the same and equals 1 for each alternative,
and it is independent of –can be separated from– the payoﬀ types of other agents. This
justiﬁes the term “weakly non-separable” environments.
The next deﬁnition is borrowed from AKS (2010):
Definition 14 An environment E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ) satisﬁes first-order type di-
versity (FOTD) if there do not exist i ∈ N, ti = (θi, qi), t′i = (θ
′
i, q
′
i) ∈ Ti with θi 
= θ
′
i
such that
Vi(θi, qi) = Vi(θ
′
i, q
′
i).
Without loss of generality, we focus only on agent i throughout. Since the payoﬀ type
space Θ is ﬁnite, we can denote Θ−i = {θh−i}Hh=1.
Lemma 4 (The set of first-order beliefs in Δ0(Θ−i) under which FOTD holds is open)
Let Δ∗ be the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs in Δ0(Θ−i) under which FOTD holds. Then, Δ∗ is
open, i.e., for every qi ∈ Δ∗ there exists δ > 0 such that for any dqi ∈ RH with ‖dqi‖ < δ,
we have that for any θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i, and any q
′
i ∈ Δ∗,
Vi(θi, qi + dqi) 
= Vi(θ′i, q
′
i)
where qi + dqi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i).
Proof : Pick qi ∈ Δ∗, the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs in Δ0(Θ−i) over which FOTD holds.
Recall that Δ(Θ−i) is compact. Take an open cover of Δ(Θ−i) as follows. The ε-open set
Oε in the open cover consists of all q
′
i’s such that
|Vi(qi)− Vi(q′i)| =
∑
θi
∑
θ
′
i =θi
∑
k
|V ki (θi, qi)− V ki (θ
′
i, q
′
i)| < ε.
Thus, Δ(Θ−i) ⊆
⋃
ε Oε. By compactness, take a ﬁnite subcover {O1, O2, . . . , Or} such that
Δ(Θ−i) ⊆ O1 ∪ · · · ∪Or, which means that there exist a ﬁnite collection of increasing εi’s
with ε1 < · · · < εr whose associated open sets also cover Δ(Θ−i), and a fortiori, also cover
Δ∗, a subset of Δ0(Θ−i), itself a subset of Δ(Θ−i).
It follows that Δ∗ = (Q1 ∩Δ∗) ∪ · · · ∪ (Qr ∩Δ∗), where
Q1 = {q′i : |Vi(qi)− Vi(q
′
i)| < ε1};
Q2 = {q′i : ε1/2 < |Vi(qi)− Vi(q
′
i)| < ε2};
Q3 = {q′i : ε2/2 < |Vi(qi)− Vi(q
′
i)| < ε3};
...
...
...
Qr = {q′i : εr−1/2 < |Vi(qi)− Vi(q
′
i)| < εr}.
Without loss of generality, assume that Q2 ∩ Δ∗ 
= ∅. (If not, then we would have
Δ∗ = Q1 ∩Δ∗. By choosing ε1 small enough, thanks to FOTD, we can always make sure
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that Q2 ∩ Δ∗ 
= ∅.) For any δ > 0, let Oδ(qi) ≡ {qi + dqi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i) : ‖dqi‖ < δ} be
a δ-neighborhood of qi. Choose arbitrarily q
′
i in the set Q
2 ∩ Δ∗ to satisfy that ε1/2 <
|Vi(qi)− Vi(q′i)| < ε2, and also by FOTD, |Vi(θi, qi)− Vi(θ
′
i, q
′
i)| > 0 for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with
θi 
= θ′i. Due to the continuity of expected utility, we can choose δ(q
′
i) > 0 suﬃciently small
so that for any qi + dqi ∈ Oδ(q′i)(qi), one has that ε1/2 < |Vi(qi + dqi) − Vi(q
′
i)| < ε2 and
|Vi(θi, qi + dqi)− Vi(θ′i, q
′
i)| > 0 for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i. Deﬁne
δ ≡ inf
q
′
i∈Q2∩Δ∗
δ(q
′
i).
Note that δ > 0 is well deﬁned because |Vi(qi) − Vi(q′i)| > ε1/2 for any q
′
i ∈ Q2 ∩Δ∗ and
because of FOTD. This implies that for any qi+dqi ∈ Oδ(qi), ε1/2 < |Vi(qi+dqi)−Vi(q′i)| <
ε2 and |Vi(θi, qi+dqi)−Vi(θ′i, q
′
i)| > 0 for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i and any q
′
i ∈ Q2∩Δ∗.
Thus, we conclude that Oδ(qi) ⊆ Q2 ∩Δ∗ ⊆ Δ∗ and therefore, the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs
in Δ0(Θ−i) under which FOTD holds is open. 
Lemma 5 Suppose that a payoﬀ environment EΔ = (A,Θi, ui)i∈N is weakly non-separable.
Then, for any pair qi, q
′
i ∈ Δ0(Θ−i) for which FOTD is violated, there exists δ¯ > 0 for which
for any δ ∈ (0, δ¯], there exists dqi ∈ RH with ‖dqi‖ < δ such that for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with
θi 
= θ′i,
Vi(θi, qi + dqi) 
= Vi(θ′i, q
′
i + dqi),
where qi + dqi, q
′
i + dqi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i).
Proof : Fix arbitrarily a pair of ﬁrst-order beliefs qi, q
′
i for which FOTD is violated.
That is, for such a pair of ﬁrst-order beliefs, we consider payoﬀ types θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi with
θi 
= θ′i such that:
Vi(θi, qi) = Vi(θ
′
i, q
′
i).
Since Θ is ﬁnite, we can denote by Λ a ﬁnite index set such that for each λ = (,m), there
exists the corresponding pair of payoﬀ types (θi , θ
m
i ) for which Vi(θ

i , qi) = Vi(θ
m
i , q
′
i).
Since the payoﬀ environment is weakly non-separable, for each such pair of relevant
payoﬀ types θi , θ
m
i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θmi , there exist θ−i, θ
′
−i ∈ Θ−i with θ−i 
= θ
′
−i and
ak ∈ A such that
ui(ak; θi , θ−i)− ui(ak; θi , θ
′
−i) 
= ui(ak; θmi , θ−i)− ui(ak; θmi , θ
′
−i).
We deﬁne θλ1−i ≡ θ−i and θλ2−i ≡ θ
′
−i and for each pair (θ

i , θ
m
i ) associated with each λ, ﬁx
such θλ1−i and θ
λ2
−i.
Deﬁne dqi ∈ RH as follows:
• dqi =
∑
(,m)∈Λ:(θi ,θmi ) dqi[,m];
• dqi[,m](θλ1−i) = ελ where ε > 0;
• dqi[,m](θλ2−i) = −ελ;
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• dqi[,m](θh˜−i) = 0 for any h˜ 
= λ1, λ2
By construction, we note the following three facts: (1)
∑
θ−i dqi[,m](θ−i) = 0 for any
(,m) ∈ Λ; (2) ∑θ−i dqi(θ−i) = 0; and (3) dqi 
= 0.
Fix δ > 0 small enough. Since Θ is ﬁnite, we can choose ε > 0 small enough so that
‖dqi‖ < δ. For a suﬃciently small δ > 0, we guarantee that qi + dqi, q′i + dqi ∈ Δ0(Θ−i).
By weak non-separability of the payoﬀ environment and by construction of the speciﬁc dqi,
we get that for every (,m) ∈ Λ,
Vi(θi , qi + dqi) 
= Vi(θmi , q
′
i + dqi).
So we conclude that for any δ > 0 small enough there exists dqi ∈ RH with ‖dqi‖ < δ
such that for any θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i, involved in a violation of FOTD, there exists a
ﬁrst-order belief in that δ-neighborhood for which such a violation ceases to exist.
Remark: The ﬁniteness of Θ seems to be essential for Lemma 5. As a consequence, the
same comment applies to Theorem 3, Corollary 1, and Lemma 6 below. On the other hand,
all the other results in the current paper, with minor modiﬁcations in their proofs, extend
if one assumes a compact set of Θi. It follows that our results with bearing on partial
or exact full implementation cover signiﬁcantly more environments than those for virtual
implementation. Having said that, we do not have a counterexample to Lemma 5 for the
case of inﬁnite compact payoﬀ type spaces. Recall that Jehiel et al (2006) and Hashimoto
(2008) deﬁne Θi to be a compact convex subset of a ﬁnite dimensional Euclidean space,
and Bergemann and Morris (2009b) deﬁne it to be a compact interval in the real line.
The two lemmas together comprise the proof of the following result:
Theorem 3 Suppose that the payoﬀ environment EΔ = (A,Θi, ui)i∈N is weakly non-
separable. Then, robust measurability is generically a trivial condition. Speciﬁcally, for
every i ∈ N , there exists a residual subset, i.e., a countable intersection of open and dense
subsets, Δ∗ ⊂ Δ0(Θ−i) for which the property of ﬁrst-order type diversity holds.15
Proof : Fix arbitrarily a pair of ﬁrst-order beliefs qi, q
′
i in Δ
0(Θ−i) for which FOTD is
violated. First, we claim that the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs violating FOTD in a neighborhood
around (qi, q
′
i) is nowhere dense in Δ
0(Θ−i). Deﬁne O(qi, q′i) to be an arbitrary open set
in Δ0(Θ−i) containing qi and q
′
i. By Lemma 5, we can choose δ > 0 small enough such
that qi + dqi and q
′
i + dqi are contained in O(qi, q
′
i). By the continuity of expected utility,
if we choose δ > 0 small enough, there exists a nonempty open set of ﬁrst-order beliefs
satisfying FOTD in O(qi, q′i). In other words, the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs violating FOTD
in O(qi, q′i) is not dense in Δ0(Θ−i). Therefore, the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs violating FOTD
in a neighborhood around (qi, q
′
i) is nowhere dense in Δ
0(Θ−i).
Since Δ0(Θ−i) is separable, it contains a countable dense subset. Thus, it will suﬃce
to base our arguments on a countable set of pairs qi, q
′
i for which there is a violation of
FOTD. That is, consider payoﬀ types θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i, such that:
Vi(θi, qi) = Vi(θ
′
i, q
′
i)
15By robust measurability being generically a trivial condition, we mean that A-M measurability is a
trivial condition over a residual set of ﬁrst-order types.
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for some qi, q
′
i ∈ Δ0(Θ−i). Fix arbitrarily a countably inﬁnite index set, Λ = {1, 2, . . . }.
Assume that each λ ∈ Λ corresponds to a pair of ﬁrst-order types λ = ((θi , qi ), (θmi , qmi ))
that exhibits violations of FOTD. Denote by Δλ the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs violating
FOTD in a neighborhood O(qi , qmi ). Then,
⋃
λ∈Λ Δλ contains the entire set of ﬁrst-order
beliefs violating FOTD in Δ0(Θ−i). By the previous argument, we know that
⋃
λ∈Λ Δλ is
a countable union of nowhere dense sets in Δ0(Θ−i). Since Δ∗ ⊇ Δ0(Θ−i)\
⋃
λ∈Λ Δλ, we
can conclude with Lemma 4 that Δ∗ is a countable intersection of open and dense subsets.
Recall that Δ∗ denotes the entire set of ﬁrst-order beliefs satisfying FOTD in Δ0(Θ−i).
That is, Δ∗ forms a residual set in Δ0(Θ−i).
The rest of the proof will be completed after observing that if an environment satisﬁes
FOTD, all ﬁrst-order types can be separated in the ﬁrst iteration of the measurability
algorithm, implying that the ﬁnal partition thereof, Ψ∗, is the ﬁnest partition, consisting
of all singletons. 
Let Vi : Θi×Δ(Θ−i)→ RK be an agent i’s vector of ﬁrst-order expected utilities over all
constant SCFs. Recall our normalization of expected utility for each ﬁrst-order type. Thus,
for each (θi, qi), Vi(θi, qi) ∈ [0, 1]K . Deﬁne Vi to be the set of agent i’s normalized ﬁrst-order
expected utility functions. We endow Vi with the uniform metric.16 Let V ≡ V1× · · ·×Vn.
Now, we can rephrase the above result in terms of payoﬀs as follows:
Corollary 1 Suppose that the payoﬀ environment EΔ = (A,Θi, ui)i∈N is weakly non-
separable. Then, there exists a residual subset V∗ of V such that for all V ∈ V∗, the
property of ﬁrst-order type diversity holds.
We close this section by extending our logic to higher-order beliefs. We make use of
our coherence assumption:
Lemma 6 Suppose that an environment E = (A, {ui,Θi, Qi}i∈N ) satisﬁes the property that
Qi ≡ Δ∗ for each i ∈ N where Δ∗ is a residual subset of Δ0(Θ−i) in which the property
of ﬁrst-order type diversity holds. Then, for any coherent type space T , there do not exist
i ∈ N, τi, τ ′i ∈ Ti with θˆi(τi) 
= θˆi(τ
′
i ), such that
(U1i (τi), . . . , U
K
i (τi)) = (U
1
i (τ
′
i ), . . . , U
K
i (τ
′
i )).
Proof : Fix an arbitrary coherent type space T . As it will become clear, the argument
does not depend on any particular type space coherent with the original environment E .
Consider agent i of type τi. Let tˆi(τi) ≡ ti = (θi, qi). It follows from Lemma 1 that
Uki (τi) = V
k
i (θi, qi) for each k = 1, . . . ,K.
Thus, we obtain Uki (τi) = V
k
i (θi, qi) whenever tˆi(τi) = (θi, qi). Similarly, consider agent
i of type τ
′
i . Let tˆi(τ
′
i ) ≡ (θ
′
i, q
′
i). Then, we obtain U
k
i (τ
′
i ) = V
k
i (θ
′
i, q
′
i) for each k = 1, . . . ,K
whenever tˆi(τi) = (θ
′
i, q
′
i). Having established this, ﬁrst-order type diversity takes care of
the rest of the argument because we deﬁne Qi ≡ Δ∗. 
16In this case, the uniform metric dV is deﬁned by
dV (Vi, V˜i) = max
(θi,qi)∈Θi×Δ(Θ−i)
max
k=1,... ,K
|V ki (θi, qi)− V˜ ki (θi, qi)|
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6 Examples
We shall close by revisiting brieﬂy two examples, already contemplated in previous litera-
ture. The ﬁrst one illustrates the assumption of weak non-separability, which we have used
in the previous section:
Example 1 (How to generate weak non-separability) Consider the example in BM
(2009a, Section 3), also featured in AKS (2010, Section 8). We show next that although
it violates weak non-separability, a variant thereof will satisfy it. (To be faithful to the
presentation of the example in the above papers, we do not normalize ﬁrst-order expected
utilities.)
For each agent i ∈ N , let Θi be a ﬁnite subset of [0, 1]. If agent i receives the object,
his ex post valuation for it is hi(θ). Let hi : Θ → R to be
hi(θ) = θi + γ
∑
j =i
θj .
Here γ ≥ 0 is the interdependence parameter. Let ai be the outcome that agent i obtains
the object. Let a0 denote the outcome that no agent obtains the object and the seller keeps
it. Deﬁne A∗ ≡ {a0, a1, . . . , an}. Let
A ≡ A∗ × Y
where Y ⊂ Rn is a ﬁnite set such that (y1, . . . , yn) denotes the monetary transfers across
agents. Then, we have
ui((a, y1, . . . , yn); θ) =
{
hi(θ) + yi if a = ai
yi if a 
= ai
For any i ∈ N , θi ∈ Θi, θ−i, θ′−i ∈ Θ−i with θ−i 
= θ
′
−i, y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ Y , and any
a ∈ A∗, we have ui((a, y); (θi, θ−i))− ui((a, y); (θi, θ′−i)) = γ
∑
j =i(θj − θ
′
j) if a = ai or 0 if
a 
= ai. This does not depend on agent i’s payoﬀ type. Thus, weak-non-separability is not
satisﬁed.
On the other hand, weak non-separability can be restored as follows. Note that the hi(·)
constructed is continuous and strictly increasing in θi. We slightly modify the previous
speciﬁcation by making the ex post utilities non-linear.
ui((a, y1, . . . , yn); θ) ≡ vi((a, y1, . . . , yn), hi(θ)) =
{
[hi(θ) + yi]
λi(hi(θ)) if a = ai
y
λi(hi(θ))
i if a 
= ai
where λi : R→ (0, 1) is an increasing function with typical term λi(hi(θ)) ∈ (0, 1).
ui((a, y); θi, θ−i)− ui((a, y); θi, θ′−i)
=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
[hi(θ) + yi]
λi(hi(θ)) −
[
hi(θi, θ
′
−i) + yi
]λi(hi(θi,θ′−i))
if a = ai
y
λi(hi(θ))
i − y
λi(hi(θi,θ
′
−i))
i if a 
= ai
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This is indeed a class of environments proposed in BM (2009b) in which both robust mono-
tonicity and robust measurability are equivalent to a condition called the contraction prop-
erty.17 Here, we can restore the weak non-separability condition by making ex post utilities
non-linear. We also observe that suﬃciency results for robust virtual implementation –for
example, Theorems 1 and 2 of AKS (2010)– will not be aﬀected by this modiﬁcation.18
The next example shows that in some environments the diﬀerence between robust
measurability and robust monotonicity is substantial, leading to a signiﬁcant gap between
the success of robust virtual implementation versus robust exact implementation.
Example 2 [Only constant SCFs satisfy local robust monotonicity] We begin by slightly
adapting the way the example is presented in Serrano (2004), an elaboration of the original
one in Palfrey and Srivastava (1987), and we proceed to its robust analysis later. Let
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. There is a single commodity – money – and all consumers have one unit
of the commodity as endowment in each state. The set of payoﬀ types is Θk = {θk, θ′k, θ
′′
k}
for k = 1, 2, while Θj = {θj, θ′j} for j = 3, 4. Let us deﬁne a subset of Θ: Θ∗ = {θ, θ
′
, θ
′′},
where θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4), θ
′
= (θ
′
1, θ
′
2, θ
′
3, θ
′
4), and θ
′′
= (θ
′′
1 , θ
′′
2 , θ
′
3, θ
′
4).
Start by ﬁxing a ﬁrst-order belief for each agent. For each k = 1, 2,
q∗k(θ−k|θk) = q∗k(θ′−k|θ′k) = q∗k(θ′′−k|θ′′k) = 1
For j = 3, 4, q∗j (θ−j|θj) = 1, but
q∗3(θ
′
−3|θ′3) = 0.25 and q∗3(θ′′−3|θ′3) = 0.75,
q∗4(θ
′
−4|θ′4) = 0.75 and q∗4(θ′′−4|θ′4) = 0.25.
Each agent i’s state dependent ex post utility is as follows: for any x ∈ R+ and any
θ ∈ Θ,
ui(x; θ) = xλi(θ)
where λi(θ) ∈ (0, 1). For every i ∈ N , we assume that for every θ, θ′ ∈ Θ with θ 
= θ′,
λi(θ) 
= λi(θ′). This environment satisﬁes weak non-separability, which means that robust
measurability is almost always a vacuous constraint.
First, assume that the set of ﬁrst-order beliefs is a singleton, i.e., Qi = {q∗i } for every
agent i ∈ N . Note that incentive compatibility is not a constraint in this environment.
Let f be an SCF such that for some θ, θ′ ∈ Θ∗ with θ′ 
= θ, f(θ) 
= f(θ′). We denote
f(θ) as (f1(θ), f2(θ), f3(θ), f4(θ)) where fi(θ) is the money that agent i is assigned by the
SCF f in payoﬀ state θ. Consider a deception α such that αi(θ˜i) = θi for every θ˜i ∈ Θi
and every i ∈ N . For this deception, f 
= f ◦ α since f ◦ α is a constant SCF that assigns
f(θ) in every payoﬀ state. For any agent i ∈ N , any θ˜i ∈ Θi and any SCF y, it follows
that
Vi(f |αi(θ˜i), q∗i ) ≥ Vi(y|αi(θ˜i), q∗i ) ⇒ fi(θ)λi(θ) ≥ yi(θ)λi(θ) ⇒ fi(θ) ≥ yi(θ).
17See BM (2009b) for the deﬁnition of the contraction property. In the case of linear ex post utilities of
this example, the contraction property is equivalent to the condition that γ < 1/(n− 1).
18Hashimoto (2008) succeeded in generalizing the genericity result of Jehiel et al (2006) to the environ-
ments that encompass similar non-linearities. Unlike these papers, note that our genericity argument does
not need consumption externalities.
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Since f ◦ α and y ◦ α specify f(θ) and y(θ) in every state, it follows that
Vi(f ◦ α|θ˜i, q∗i ) ≥ Vi(y ◦ α|θ˜i, q∗i )
for any θ˜i ∈ Θi.
Now, we perturb q∗ slightly. Agent k = 1, 2’s ﬁrst-order beliefs over Θ are given by:
qεk(θ˜−k|θk) =
{
1− δ(θk) if θ˜−k = θ−k
ε otherwise
qεk(θ˜−k|θ′k) =
{
1− δ(θ′k) if θ˜−k = θ′−k
ε otherwise
qεk(θ˜−k|θ′k) =
{
1− δ(θ′′k) if θ˜−k = θ′′−k
ε otherwise
where δ(θk) = δ(θ′k) = δ(θ
′′
k) = 11ε. Agent j = 3, 4’s ﬁrst-order beliefs over Θ are given by:
qεj (θ˜−j|θj) =
{
1− δ(θj) if θ˜−j = θ−j
ε otherwise
qε3(θ˜−3|θ′3) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0.25− δ(θ′3) if θ˜−3 = θ′−3
0.75− δ(θ′3) if θ˜−3 = θ′′−3
ε otherwise
qε4(θ˜−4|θ′4) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0.75− δ(θ′4) if θ˜−4 = θ′−4
0.25− δ(θ′4) if θ˜−4 = θ′′−4
ε otherwise
where δ(θj) = 17ε; and δ(θ′3) = δ(θ
′
4) = 16ε. For any agent i ∈ N, θ˜i ∈ Θi and any SCF y,
assume Vi(f |αi(θ˜i), qεi ) ≥ Vi(y|αi(θ˜i), qεi ). By the continuity of expected utility, there exists
ε¯i > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯i], the above inequality implies fi(θ) ≥ yi(θ).
Let ε¯ = min{ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4}. Deﬁne Q0i = {qεi }ε≤ε¯ for each i ∈ N . Since f ◦ α and y ◦ α
specify f(θ) and y(θ) in every state, we have that for any i ∈ N , any θ˜i ∈ Θi, and any
qi ∈ Q0i ,
Vi(f ◦ α|θ˜i, qi) ≥ Vi(y ◦ α|θ˜i, qi).
In sum, for any i ∈ N and any θ˜i ∈ Θi, we conclude
Vi(f |θi, qi) ≥ Vi(yαi(θ˜i)|θi, qi) ∀qi ∈ Q0i ⇒ Vi(f ◦ α|θ˜i, qi) ≥ Vi(y ◦ α|θ˜i, qi) ∀qi ∈ Q0i .
Hence, the SCF f violates local robust monotonicity. In particular, only constant SCFs
satisfy local robust monotonicity.
Finally, we discuss incentive compatibility. Assume that a free disposal technology is
available. Let f be an arbitrary non-constant SCF over Θ∗ = {θ, θ′, θ′′}. For every agent
i ∈ N and every θ˜ ∈ Θ, deﬁne
f˜i(θ˜) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
fi(θ) if θ˜−i = θ−i
fi(θ′) if θ˜−i = θ
′
−i
fi(θ′′) if θ˜−i = θ
′′
−i
0 otherwise.
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Deﬁne an SCF f˜ to be such that f˜(θ) = (f˜1(θ), f˜2(θ), f˜3(θ), f˜4(θ)) for any θ ∈ Θ. By
construction, f˜ is well deﬁned (thanks to the free disposal technology) and satisﬁes ex post
incentive compatibility. Besides, f˜ is equivalent to f over Θ∗.
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